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Résumés
中国公共知识界诞生于五四时期，深受毛泽东时代反智主义之害，重兴于八十年代中
期，在九十年代商业化大潮中面临着价值重建与自身定位的危机。本文试图通过分析
2005年“超级女声”比赛期间在中国大众媒体上展开的两场争议以探讨中国公共知识界的
现状。其中，一部分知识分子试图从审美趣味和民主理念方面启蒙大众，但其精英地位
受到质疑；另一部分知识分子肯定大众文化的地位和作用，并且鼓励公共参与热情。作
者认为，面临21世纪民主化、市场化、职业化与全球化的挑战，当代中国知识分子应当
反思自身的定位，扮演立法者与阐释者的双重角色。
Since  its  emergence  in  the  May  Fourth  Era,  the  Chinese  intellectual  sphere  barely
survived the Maoist regime, thrived in the mid-1980s, and experienced enlargement and
pluralisation  in  the  1990s.  This  essay  intends  to  re-examine  the  current  Chinese
intellectual sphere by an analysis of two controversies about the 2005 Super Girl Voice
Contest. The key issues in public commentaries and debates focused on the evaluation
of commercial popular culture and democratic progress in China. These controversies
illustrate how the masses demonstrate a power base that could transfer easily to the
political sphere, and that there has been resistance to this massive power using the idea
of intellectualism. The author suggests that Chinese intellectuals shall play both roles of
legislators  and  interpreters  to  meet  challenges  of  democratization,  marketization,
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professionalism and globalization in the 21st century.
Texte intégral
The Chinese Intellectual Sphere: Its
Problems and Challenges
The notion public sphere, in a Habermasian sense, refers to “a domain of our
social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed”. All citizens
have access to this space to deal with matters of general interests by expressing
and publicizing their opinions freely.1 In the public sphere, intellectuals play a
crucial  role.  The intellectual  engagement  in  public  affairs  is  the  intellectual
sphere, defined by Gu and Goldman as “a symbolic realm of knowledge, values
and  meanings  -  or,  in  a  word,  discourses”.2  In  the  Chinese  context,  the
intellectual-initiated May Fourth Movement as “enlightenment and the quest
for  modernity”  against  the  Western  intrusion  marked  the  emergence  of
intellectual sphere.3
1
The Chinese equivalence of “intellectual” is zhishi fenzi, 知识分子, a term that
requires  our  scrutiny  before  further  discussion.4  It  historically  denoted  the
‘scholar-gentry’  (shi,  士),  who  generally  originated  from  the  landlord  or
peasantry  class.  When  they  passed  the  Imperial  Examination  based  on  the
Confucian canon, they gained access to the State’s bureaucracy and thereafter
became  ‘civil  servants’  (shi,  仕).  The  Chinese  intellectuals  had  located
themselves in both the imperial court (miaotang, 庙堂) and far away from the
Capital, i.e.  jianghu (江湖).5 It was not until the early twentieth century that
the  modern  generation  of  Chinese  intellectuals  emerged  due  to  two  major
reasons. First, the scholar-gentry lost their political prestige when the Imperial
Examination system was suspended by the Qing Dynasty in year 1905, six years
before  the  1911  revolution  that  ended  the  last  imperial  regime  in  China.
Secondly,  Western  intrusion  and  colonization  aroused  collective  intellectual
concerns  that  prioritized  “a  national  salvation”  and  “the  salvation  of
mankind”.6  They  turned  to  the  “cultural-intellectualistic  approach”,  which
implied a fundamental belief among Chinese intellectuals that cultural change
was the foundation for all other necessary changes.7
2
Leaders  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  followed  this  approach  that
incorporated culture to serve revolutionary ends.8 Mao Zedong persisted in the
bottom-up “popularization of literature and arts” as the cultural policy of CCP
initiated  by  his  predecessors  Chen  Duxiu  and  Qu  Qiubai.9  During  Mao’s
totalist10  regime,  the  Chinese  intellectual  sphere  barely  survived  Party-state
co-optation  and  suppression  through  consecutive  ideological  movements
(sixiang  yundong,  思想运动).11  Mao  established  his  absolute  power  and
ideological doctrines for Chinese literati during the Rectification Movement.12
By redefining “knowledge,” he declared the ignorance of the “intellectuals” and
therefore  instructed  the  intellectuals  to  “go  to  the  people”  (dao  qunzhong
zhong  qu,  到群众中去)  in  order  to  be  remoulded  and  assimilated  by  the
masses.13 In his political life, Mao adhered to this “remoulding of intellectuals”
policy that subordinated the Chinese intellectuals to the party-state.14 In 1943,
3
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the  edited  version  of  Talks  was  published  by  Jiefang  Ribao  解放日报
[Liberation Daily] and later announced by CCP as the route of literary creation.
Thereafter, Mao’s literary thoughts eliminated the last lingering flow of May
Fourth  legacy  and  determined  the  course  of  cultural  policy  of  the  People’s
Republic  of  China.15  This  policy  went  to  an  extreme and shattered Chinese
intellectual  sphere  during  the  turbulent  era  of  the  Mao-incited  Cultural
Revolution  when  intellectuals  were  brutally  abused  and  humiliated  as  the
“reactionary class”.16
The tremendous changes in Deng’s reform era contributed to the resurgence
of  a  Chinese  intellectual  sphere.  The  mid-1980s  witnessed  the  Xin  qimeng
yundong 新启蒙运动 [New Enlightenment movement] and Wenhua Re 文化热
[Culture Fever]. The former, as Xu Jilin considered, was “an extremely complex
intellectual project” that demonstrated “a unity of cultural stance yet a disparity
of  intellectual  endeavours”.  The  participants  in  this  movement  shared  the
concern that cultural modernization would influence China’s possible political
reform  while  seeking  theoretical  supports  from  various  sources.17  And  the
latter, as Jing Wang interpreted, manifested “the intellectuals’ ‘methodological
fever’ on the nation’s cultural agenda, the massive propagation of the formula
for  a  market  economy,  and the  reiteration of  the  imperative  that  the  Party
discuss political reform”.18
4
In the 1990s,  significant changes took place in intellectual-state relations.
The state granted greater tolerance to intellectual spaces as long as they did not
directly challenge the regime and the power elite. More intellectual freelancers
appeared in the growing market economy, while the vast majority of Chinese
intellectuals  remained  in  the  state-run  research  institutes  and  universities.
Such  enlargement  and  pluralisation  of  intellectual  public  space  have  led  to
larger intellectual autonomy from political interference, which was comparable
to their East-European counterparts. Chinese intellectual sphere was filled with
a  variety  of  ideas  of  vigorous  debates.19  During  this  period,  Chinese
intellectuals experienced disagreement and disconnection. The most significant
development in the late 1990s was the public stand-off between groups that
have come to be characterized as “the liberals” (ziyouzhuyi, 自由主义) and “the
New  Left”  (xinzuopai,  新左派).20  By  the  end  of  the  1990s,  the  Chinese
intellectual sphere had been completely transformed. The origins of this change
can be identified in currents of  thought that  first  appeared in the 1980s.  A
unified intellectual sphere in which people can engage in profitable dialogue no
longer exists.21
5
He  Baogang  raised  four  challenges  of  Chinese  intellectuals  in  the  new
century.  The  first  challenge  came  from  the  paradoxical  identification  of
intellectuals  in  mass  democracy.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Chinese  idea  of
intellectuals that aims at educating ordinary people is not compatible with the
populist idea of democracy that favours egalitarianism. On the other hand, the
traditional role of Chinese intellectuals as state legislators is contradictory with
the intellectual autonomy. Secondly, the multiple channels of plural society as a
result of market economy have decreased the weight of one intellectual voice
and have weakened intellectuals’ influence. Thirdly, academic professionalism,
which  further  divides  intellectual  labour  in  specialized  research  fields,  has
increased the importance of specific experts yet has undermined the position of
critical intellectuals. Fourthly, the globalization of Chinese scholars has brought
up the issue of social criticism in cross-cultural backgrounds. Overseas Chinese
6
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The 2005 Super Girl Voice Singing
Contest: A Media and Social event
scholars may lose their critical edge since their intellectual audiences are not
necessarily Chinese and they cannot participate in local affairs.22
My analysis  of  the mediated controversies  focuses on Chinese intellectual
sphere in the 21st century when taking its problems and challenges as a point of
departure. I intend to re-examine this public space in contemporary China by
reviewing  two  mediated  controversies  during  the  2005  Super  Girl  Voice
contest. This review of intellectual discourses23 addresses six questions: 1) Who
were the agents involved? 2) What discourses were drawn upon? 3) How were
they articulated together? 4) Where did this articulation take place? 5) What
particular  direction  did  this  discursive  event  give  to  the  articulation  of  the
political order of discourse? 6) What wider social and cultural processes have
shaped  and  have  been  shaped  by  the  way  this  discursive  event  articulates
genres, discourses and ethoses?24
7
First  aired  in  year  2004  as  an  imitation  of  American  Idol,  the  Chaoji
Nüsheng 超级女声 [The Super Girl Voice] Singing Contest (hereafter referred
as SGV Contest) was produced by the Hunan satellite television station (Hunan
TV) with sponsorship of the Mengniu Group.25 Female-exclusive, this contest
invited any aspiring female singer to ‘sing along as loud as she wants’26 without
any limitation, e.g. age, appearance or singing skills.27 Every applicant has had
her audition in front of a panel of professional judges in the preliminary rounds
filmed in four cities around China.28  The shortlisted contestants entered the
regional elimination contests that were broadcasted live to television viewers.
The viewers voted for their favourite singer via telephone calls or mobile phone
text messages. The finalists selected from the regional rounds went to HNTV in
Changsha  for  the  national  finals,  where  television  viewers  determined  the
winners by phone-in or text message votes. The top finalists won contracts for
professional singers from Shanghai Tianyu Company.29 The 16 year-old second
runner-up Zhang Hanyun became a household name overnight after her song
“Sweet  and  sour  is  me”  aired  with  a  television  advertisement  for  Mengniu
yogurt.30
8
The second season of the SGV Contest in 2005 made some new attempts to
mediate  professional  aesthetics  and  the  masses’  tastes  by  its  deliberately
designed elimination mechanism. It continued regional auditions in five cities,
which attracted more than 150,000 contestants in total. In a sequential series
of regional contests, the entrants were eliminated by a procedure comprised of
the panel’s decision and votes by the viewers via phone calls or mobile phone
text  messages.  A  “panel  of  the  masses”  of  thirty-one  members  would  vote
between the contestant favoured by the panel and the one with the most votes
among the rest of contestants.31  In the national finals, the television viewers
selected the top finalists via text messages and phone calls.32 The SGV fad was
unprecedented in terms of its commercial gain and public involvement. The
last episode of the national final on the night of August 26th, 2005, drew over
280 million viewers  at  one point.  The champion Li  Yuchun won 3,528,308
votes; the first runner-up Zhou Bichang won 3,270,840 votes; and the second
9
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Criticising Vulgar Popular Culture
vs. Endorsing Cultural Pluralism
runner-up Zhang Liangying 1,353,906. Li Yuchun made the cover story of Time
Magazine Asia special issue as one of “Asia's Heroes” and “a national icon,” for
she “represents unabashed individuality.” Times Asia drew an analogy between
SGV contest and its prototype American Idol: “like American Idol, but unlike
China itself,  Super  Girl's  Voice  is  run democratically”.33  Richard Spencer,  a
correspondent for The Daily Telegraph saw the 2005 SGV contest as an arena
where  individualism,  “a  way  of  looking  at  life  that  many  Chinese  insist  is
western and alien to their culture,” was much exercised. Li was described as “a
good symbol of the Chinese society”.34
As the national finals were broadcast from mid-July to the end of August,
media  coverage  shifted  from  news  features  and  personal  profiles  to
commentaries and intellectual discussion. These controversial discourses were
articulated in two venues. The first venue of publication was liberal newspapers
such  as  Nanfang  Dushi  Bao  南方都市报  [Southern  Metropolitan  Daily],
Nanfang Zhoumo 南方周末 [Southern Weekend], Nanfang Renwu Zhoukan 南
方人物周刊  [Southern  People  Weekly],  Xinjing  Bao  新京报  [Beijing  News],
Beijing Qingnian Bao 北京青年报 [Beijing Youth Daily], etc.35 On the contrary,
this event was intentionally ignored by Party organs such as Renmin Ribao 人
民日报,  Jiefang  Ribao  解放日报,  and  their  provincial  counterparts.36  The
second venue was the internet-based forums for Chinese liberalist intellectuals,
i.e. Shiji Zhongguo 世纪中国 and Wenhua yanjiu wang 文化研究网.37
10
These public  commentaries  shared the common ground that  SGV contest
was  a  commercial  breakthrough,  massive  cultural  movement,  and  a  media
event of great social impact. The key issue of its controversy lay in the cultural
orientation to which this event would lead.38 This was where opinions diverged.
The first controversy focused on the aesthetic taste of the SGV Contest. Should
it  be  celebrated  for  its  “reaction  to  the  elite  culture”  or  condemned for  its
“vulgar characteristics”? The second controversy concerned the authenticity of
“Chaonü Democracy”. The SGV Contest succeeded in its open access and voting
mechanism,  which  encourages  mass  participation.  Should  they  be  read  as
indicators of the emergence of Chinese civil society and democratic progress?
11
Scholarly  criticism  of  the  SGV  Contest  mainly  targeted  its  profit-making
nature  and  vulgarity.  Zhang  Hong,  head  of  the  Philosophy  Department  at
Tongji University, stressed on the dichotomy between art and mass culture. He
associated the SGV Contest with some other massive activities in contemporary
China.39  Zhu  Dake,  cultural  critic  and  professor  at  Shanghai  University,
described  this  contest  as  ‘anti-intellectualist’  that  shows  the  taste  of  the
masses.40  The  climax  came  during  a  symposium  against  “vulgarization  in
entertainment-oriented programs” convened by the Committee of Presenters of
Radio and Television of the Chinese Radio and Television Association. In this
symposium, Shi Tongyu, researcher at the Academy of Social Sciences of China,
made a statement that ‘the television rating is the root of all evil’. He used the
SGV Contest as an example of profit-driven “vulgar television programmes”.
Cui Yongyuan, a famous television talk show host at  CCTV, supported Shi’s
12
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criticism  against  the  viewership  domination.  However,  they  overlooked  the
similar case of Mengxiang Zhongguo 梦想中国 [Dream China] held by CCTV 2
at the same period. Their intention to criticise the profit-oriented strategy of
public  television  was  interpreted  by  Jinghua  Shibao  京华时报  [The  Beijing
Times]  as  an elitist  attack on popular culture,  with the SGV Contest  as  the
major target.41
The criticism of Shi and Cui evoked counteraction and met a firm rebuttal.
On the internet-based Tianya  Forum, a boycott against CCTV was initiated.
Freelance  columnist  and  influential  blogger  Lian  Yue  published  his
commentaries on Nanfang Dushibao on July 22, arguing for cultural pluralism
instead of  cultural  monopoly.42  In  a  more sarcastic  essay  on his  blog,  Lian
depicted Cui Yongyuan as the spokesperson of the CCTV interest group, which
represented  the  ‘high  brow’  while  the  Hunan  TV  promoted  vulgar  popular
culture.  Lian’s  remarks  were  quoted  in  an  in-depth  report  about  the  SGV
Contest in Nanfang Zhoumo, which presented this phenomenon as one of the
crucial social events in contemporary China and Hunan TV as a challenger to
the CCTV monopoly.43
13
What  lay  beyond  the  criticism  of  vulgarity  was  the  deep  concern  that
commercial ends would lead to the downfall  of culture, as expressed by Shi
Tongyu in his article published on Xin Jing Bao  on August 22, 2005.44  This
criticism  manifested  the  “collective  academic  unconsciousness  of  Chinese
scholars”  that  was  prevailed  in  the  1980s.  As  commercial  popular  culture
flourished and the enlightenment mission failed, Chinese intellectuals turned
to the Frankfurt  School  for theoretical  remedy.45  Shi  proposed an approach
articulating positions of Frankfurt School and the Birmingham School within
television studies in China, but he also admitted a preference for the Frankfurt
school  due  to  the  “gate-keeper  complex”  of  intellectuals.46  Shi  and  Cui’s
dilemma  reflected  the  conflict  between  State  legislator  and  intellectual
autonomy. Their suggestion of separating public and commercial television to
prevent  abuse  of  public  resources  was  just;  however,  they  were  still
“underdogs” subject to state-control rather than “watchdogs” that speak for the
public interests.47 In an interview with Nanfang Renwu Zhoukan in September
2005, Cui Yongyuan elaborated on his opposition against the vulgarization of
Chinese television without touching the core of this problem, which was, and
still is the state-controlled marketization of Chinese mass media.48 During his
online discussion with Chinese netizens at Renmin Wang 人民网 [People Net]
on August 4, 2006, Shi Tongyu responded to a question about his impartial
criticism at  SGV Contest  while  leaving  Mengxiang Zhongguo  alone:  firstly,
considering that CCTV as a national channel represents the national image, he
avoided “radical  criticism” of  its  misconducts;  secondly,  as  a  scholar  of  the
China Academy of  Social  Science,  he would naturally  show a preference for
CCTV.49
14
The dispute about the vulgarity of popular culture was concluded with an
open discussion among three Chinese scholars reported by Xin Jing Bao  on
August 20.50 Zhu Dake abandoned his opposition against the SGV Contest as
he saw the “passion of the Chinese masses in public involvement.” Li Yinhe,
sociologist at the Academy of Social Sciences of China and renowned feminist
scholar, shared this view and saw this contest as the rise of mass culture against
the monopoly of elite culture. She maintained that sheer entertainment should
be encouraged and separated from education and instruction.  Yu Guoming,
15
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I think that the Chinese society still lacks the process of secularization.
What we had in the past was a so-called ‘highbrow’ society. The utopian
ideals  that  we  had  pursued  in  the  Cultural  Revolution  aimed  at  the
sanctification of every person. Everyone was to be homogenized with one
single value system and one cultural condition. This is not ‘harmony with
difference’  that  defines  the  harmonious  society.  The  compulsory
homogenization would be the greatest abuse of humanity, human nature
and human values. Rather than the vulgarization, such abuse that runs
counter to humanity and morality shall be condemned!
我觉得中国社会还缺少世俗化的过程。过去我们是一个所谓很高雅的社
会，文化大革命当中我们纯粹追求最高理想，每个人都要做圣人，这样的
东西实际上是要把所有的人都塑造成一种类型，一种价值取向，一种文化
状态的人，这不是和谐社会应该追求的所谓和而不同的社会。如果硬要不
同的社会状态趋同，这实际上是对人性、人的本能、人的价值的最大侮
蔑，这是最不人性的，最不道德的，最反动的，这是比那种庸俗化更值得
谴责的事情！
Embracing Chinese Civil Society vs.
Demystifying the Chao Nü
Democracy
vice-dean of the Faculty of Media and Communication at Renmin University,
maintained  that  the  SGV  Contest  was  a  critical  phenomenon  in  the  socio-
cultural  domain  that  deserved  much  attention,  for  it  indicates  the
de-monopolization of the elite culture with the emergence of popular culture.
He attached high importance to the egalitarian elimination of SGV Contest that
“ignores family background, experiences and professional qualifications, and
instead focused on the candidates’ personal charisma”.51 Furthermore, the SGV
Contest succeeded in mobilizing the audiences through the voting mechanism
and their reaction to the elimination panel. Yu demonstrated strong despise to
the cultural monopoly in the Mao Era:
That being stated, the “elite culture” that the three scholars referred to in this
discussion was the hegemonic culture that served political ends in the totalist
regime.  In  the  1980s’  New  Enlightenment  Movement,  the  notion  of  ‘elite
culture’  denoted the intellectual  quest to reinstate the social  values to serve
China’s pursuit of modernity.52 The diversified cultural practices in the 1990s
challenged  this  elite-mass  cultural  dichotomy  and  required  new
epistemological  approaches.53  The  majority  of  Chinese  intellectuals,  as  Dai
Jinhua observed, feared the manipulation of the masses yet failed to engage in
the  emergent  popular  culture.  Therefore,  they  were  rendered  speechless  by
their  own  paradoxical  position.54  This  discussion  showed  an  intellectual
endorsement of cultural pluralism, which marked a different position in their
attitude towards popular culture.
16
In  an  article  published  by  Nanfang  dushibao  on  July  31,  2005,  Wang
Zhengxu  associated  the  Super  Girl  Voice  contest  with  the  concept  of  civil
society in a Habermasian sense. He began this article with the supposition that
the  highly  popular  Super  Girl  Voice  singing  contest  indicates  that  “the
entertainment  circle  may  be  the  place  where  the  democratic  awareness  of
Chinese people grows most rapidly”. He attributed the development of Chinese
17
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The political designers shall learn their lessons from this [phenomenon].
We  have  already  understood  the  constant  enthusiasm  in  public
engagement  of  Chinese  people  from  the  “bean  election”59  during  the
Yan’an period. Should the people fail  to express such enthusiasm; the
social entropy would increase, which would compromise the construction
of a harmonious society.
政治设计家们应该从中获得某种启示。从延安时期的“黄豆选举”中我们早
已领悟到，中国民众从来就不缺乏参与社会活动的热情。而假如这样的热
情不能获得健康的宣泄，就必然会增加整个社会的“熵值”，不利于和谐社
会的建设。
The “super girl” reminds me of “superman”. Men must have a national
PK64 mechanism that selects the best one in front of us. So what will that
be? That is by no means the “Super Boy Voice” Contest held by Hunan
Television. Rather, it should be the direct presidential and parliamentary
election in China. Since the “super girl” drives so many people crazy, how
crazy would the “superman” – presidential and parliamentary election-
be?
超女让我想起超男。男人也必须有一种全国的竞争决选PK机制，选出最
出色的人站在我们面前。那么这是什么？当然不是湖南卫视曾经的“超级
男声”，它当然应该是中国的总统直选和议员选举。超女能让这么多人疯
狂，那超男——总统和议员大选呢？那会疯狂到什么地步？
civil society to spectacular sports and entertainment events since they offered a
terrain of  public  engagement  and democratic  exercises.55  On August  22,  an
article  in  Jiangnan  Shibao  commented  the  Super  Girl  Voice  Contest  as  a
cultural  phenomenon  that  might  become  a  “cultural  mine”  worthwhile  of
further investigation.56  The author Zhu Zhida recognized the growth of civil
society within the rise of mass culture. He concluded this article with reference
to social entropy57 in China:58
On August 26, an article titled “Citizen Awareness in the SGV Selection” was
published in  Zhongguo qingnian bao.60  The author  Yang Liangqing argued
that the selection process encouraged a democratic citizenry. Yang found the
organization of the fan groups surprisingly outstanding since their supportive
actions were well disciplined and open for public supervision. In order to show
the  maximum  support  for  their  idols  during  the  live  contest,  fans  groups
switched their positions under the stage during commercial breaks. The fans of
SGV contestant Zhang Liangying organized their functions simultaneously on
the fan group public forum facilitated by the Baidu server. Judging from these
facts,  the fan groups were considered as prototypes for interest groups with
high autonomy.61
18
On the night of the last episode of the national final of SGV Contest (August
26), An Ti62 made a statement that this contest was a substitute for Chinese
democratic practices on his blog:63
19
Despite these bold remarks, An Ti admitted that his association between the
SGV Contest and democracy was rather far-fetched in the same article. Wang
Xiaoyu, a cultural critic at Tongji University in Shanghai, also held that it would
be an ‘over-interpretation’ to see SGV Contest as a democratic role model in his
article  published  in  Dongfang  Morning  Post.  He  described  the  selection
procedure as “hypnosis for democracy” since the so-called panel of the masses”
lacked impartiality. Wang concluded that the SGV spectacle could be explained
with the democracy supposition but it should not be much celebrated.65 Teng
Wei,  professor  at  South  China  Normal  University,  saw  little  value  in  the
20
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What I want to say is that the ‘Chao Nü democracy’ with its core of voting
is not a kind of good democracy but rather a form of populist democracy
that is  innately self-subversive and self-denying.  Behind this  (contest)
hides  an  invisible  hand  that  produces  hallucinations  of  people’s
supremacy by the means of voting via text messages, which are intended
to realize the conspiratorial will to power and commercial desires of its
sponsors.
我要说的是，以投票为核心的“超女民主”，不是一种好的民主，而是一种
具有内在颠覆、自我否定的民粹式民主。其背后隐藏着一只看不见的手，
通过短信投票的方式，制造一种民意至上的虚幻感，以此实现主办方隐秘
的权力意志和商业欲望。
We Chinese people are miserable.  As soon as we have  a “Super Girl”
contest that simulates democracy, a professor would step out and judge.
But when we are suppressed and deprived of our rights, these professors
in  universities  against  populist  democracy  all  fake  death  without  any
opinion.  Professor  Xu  gives  us  his  kind  reminder  against  the  future
misfortunes, but he just couldn’t care less about our current miseries.
我们中国人民很可怜的，才有了一个模拟民主的超女，就有教授来说三道
四。可当我们受到压迫的时候，当我们的利益被剥夺的时候，这些反对民
粹民主的学院教授们全部装死，没有任何发言。许教授善良地提醒我们不
要迎来未来的不幸，但是他根本不在乎我们当下的不幸。
so-called  liberty  and  democracy  in  this  contest  and  warned  the
“entertainmentization” of democracy and politics.66 A more elaborate criticism
of the notion of Chao Nü democracy was launched by Xu Jilin, a prolific scholar
on Chinese intellectual history at Eastern China Normal University. Xu tried to
“demystify the Chao Nü democracy” in his article published on August 29 by
Nanfang Dushi Bao:67
Xu argued that voting by itself does not equate to democracy, of which the
essential  factors  should  be  transparent  procedures,  equal  rights,  liberal
discussions,  respect  for  the  others,  and  impartial  rules  that  surpass  any
individual will. The SGV Contest lacked any of these factors since the selection
was manipulated by its producers who arbitrarily changed the rules. The voting
was mainly via mobile phone and voters were charged for every message they
sent. Thus, the voting right was exclusive to those with a phone and sufficient
money. In all, Xu feared that the populist democracy shown in the SGV Contest
might easily be manipulated and monopolized, a fear that ran through Xu’s
research on Chinese intellectual history. In one of his essays, Xu stressed on
two  prerequisites  of  “direct  democracy”:  legislative  and  constitutional
governance  as  the  prerequisite  of  on  the  top  level,  and  autonomous
communities  of  voluntary  citizens  on the  bottom level.  He warned that  the
Rousseauian “public opinion” would lead to populist tragedies similar to those
in  the  French  Revolution,  Russian  Revolution  and  Chinese  Cultural
Revolution.68  Xu’s  idea  represented  the  democracy  model  of  Chinese
intellectuals  which,  as  Metzger  maintained,  was  a  combination  of  “a
Rousseaustic concept of democracy as control of the government by a rational,
morally enlightened citizenry expressing the ‘general will’”, and “the Confucian
tradition’s  epistemologically  optimistic,  top-down,  utopian,  gemeinschaft
approach to politics”.69
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An Ti posted an open letter to Xu Jilin on his blog, in which he questioned
Xu’s  model  of  top-down  democracy  and  attacked  the  “cultural  elites”
represented  by  Xu.  In  his  argument,  those  who  did  not  support  the  SGV
Contest were against the people and exclusive from the “us” group:70
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Conclusion with two metaphors:
Legislators and Interpreters
This exclusive identification of “them” and “us”, however, closed the door for
further  discussion.  As  Richard  Hoggart  observed,  most  groups  gain  some
strength from their exclusiveness to form a sense of people outside who are not
“Us” in the times of social disparity.71 The logical fallacy in An Ti’s argument
was in its presupposition of the populist-elitist dichotomy, which was indeed
contradictory to the egalitarianism essence of mass democracy.
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To mediate this dispute, Cui Weiping, professor at the Beijing Film Academy,
tried to redefine democracy in the way of Hu Shi that “democracy is a way of
life” in her article published by Xin Jing Bao on August 31.72 She maintained
that democracy is rather an ideal yet to be realized both by intellectuals and by
ordinary people. In conclusion, she suggested that the stereotype presenting
democracy  as  an  elite  activity  that  is  beyond  the  reach  of  common  people
should be modified. The democratic development in China may proceed as the
Chinese  proverb  declares:  “more  grows  in  the  garden  than  the  gardener
sows”.73 And the Chinese intellectuals, including Xu Jilin, should be credited
for their efforts in the past decades to sow the seeds of democratic awareness in
the hearts of Chinese people, among which An Ti stood out as an example.
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To conclude, the two mediated controversies discussed in this essay illustrate
well how the masses demonstrate a power base that could transfer easily to the
political sphere, and that there is resistance in the political sphere to accept
that demonstration of power using the idea of intellectualism. This conclusion
brings us back to the questions that initiated this essay: What roles do Chinese
intellectuals play in China today? How do they cope with the problems and
challenges in the new century?
25
Chinese intellectuals are playing both roles of legislators and interpreters as
Zygmunt  Bauman  described.  The  “legislator”  role,  as  the  typically  modern
strategy,  consists  in   “making  authoritative  statements  which  arbitrate  in
controversies of opinions and which select those opinions which, having been
selected, become correct and binding”. The “interpreter” role as the typically
post-modern  strategy  consists  of  “translating  statements,  made  within  one
communally based tradition, so that they can be understood within the system
of  knowledge  based  on  another  tradition”.  The  latter  approach  is  aimed at
facilitating  communication  between  autonomous  participants.  As  the
modernist view of world as one of an essentially orderly totality is questioned
and post-modernist pluralism highly valued, the legislator role was challenged
and partially substituted by the interpreter role.74 In the first controversy, Shi
Tongyu’s  severe  criticism  against  the  vulgarity  of  commercial  popular
entertainment manifested Chinese intellectuals’ contempt about the aesthetic
incapability of the masses. Opposite to this elitist position, the open support for
SGV  Contest  of  Li  Yinhe,  Zhu  Dake  and  Yu  Guoming  showed  intellectual
awareness  of  cultural  pluralism as  a  remedy  of  totalist  rule.  In  the  second
controversy,  the  somehow  insufficiently  articulated  views  about  Chao  Nü
democracy demonstrated the intellectualist endeavour to introduce democratic
ideas  to  Chinese  audiences  and  interpret  this  concept  in  a  context  where
26
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Notes
1  The concept of public sphere came into shape in the eighteenth century when people
realized the difference between opinion and public opinion. In the liberal model of the
public sphere, society, as a private domain, was clearly differentiated from public power;
private persons gather in the domain between the two spheres to form a public. The
press functions as the medium in which public discussion took place. The public sphere
in  mass  welfare-states  experiences  a  structural  transformation  as  “refeudalization”.
Large  scale  organizations  form  alliances  with  the  state  and  with  one  another  while
deploying the means of “publicity” to achieve mass consensus. Thus, the political public
sphere gradually loses its critical functions. See Jürgen Habermas, « The Public Sphere »
in Steven Seidman (Ed.), Jürgen Habermas on Society and Politics: A Reader, Boston,
Massachusetts, Beacon Press, 1989, pp.231-236.
2  Gu and Goldman further  divide  the  intellectual  sphere  into  four  parts:  “scientific
space,  in which natural  and social  scientists form knowledge; policy space,  in which
intellectuals  produce  policy  advice;  political/ideological  space,  in  which  intellectuals
either defend or subvert the legitimacy of the existing regime; and cultural space, in
which  intellectuals  concern  themselves  with  transcendent  questions,  such  as  the
meaning of human life, the nature of history, the ultimate principles that govern human
society and the values of traditions and cultures. See Edward Gu and Merle Goldman, «
Introduction: The transformation of the relationship between Chinese intellectuals and
the state » in Edward Gu and Merle Goldman (Eds.),  Chinese Intellectuals between
political  sphere  is  not  yet  well  developed.  As  the  2010  Nobel  laureate  Liu
Xiaobo pointed out, when the other arenas of speech are closed, entertainment
events  are  appropriated  as  the  only  outlet  for  public  opinion.75  In  a  more
optimistic tone, overseas Chinese scholar Xu Ben attached much importance to
this  discussion  since  it  proved  that  discussions  of  social  events  and
entertainment events are mutually beneficial.76
China is in great need of reform when suffering wealth disparities and social
injustice albeit it achieved miraculous growth in economic power in the recent
decades. However, ignorant imaginaries of democracy can only be “a negative
reaction to totalitarianism than as a positive response to democracy” as Zhang
Longxi observed in the prodemocracy movements in China. It is in this sense
that  he  stressed  on  the  indispensability  of  intellectual  rigor  and  reflexive
mobility to understand democracy and its self-deconstruction.77 Kellner’s point
is  very  true  that  in  any  national  setting  intellectual  sphere  contributes  to
democratic progress with its “sustained attempts to develop alternative media
and a participatory citizenry”.78  Since its emergence, the Chinese intellectual
sphere  has  been  the  frontier  where  the  Western  idea  of  democracy  was
introduced,  advocated,  debated,  practiced,  and disseminated in  the  Chinese
reality.  At  present,  it  is  facing  not  only  the  challenges  of  democratization,
marketization, professionalism, and globalization as He Baogang summarized,
but also a call for self-reflection when drastic expansion of higher education
and  wide  application  of  telecommunication  technologies  facilitate  access  to
information  and  knowledge.79  To  meet  these  challenges,  I  suggest  that
Zhishifenzi,  the Chinese term for “intellectual”  literally meaning “knowledge
molecule”, should not be used as a normative concept that draws a boundary
between the few and the majority. Rather, it should be defined in a Baumanian
sense as “a rallying call” and “a widely opened invitation to join in a certain
kind of practice of a global-societal import”.80 Chinese intellectual sphere, thus,
should be re-visited in the light of the Saidian public intellectual, who is “an
individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a
message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for a public”.81
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State and Market, London and New York, Routledge Curzon, 2004, p6.
3  See Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the
May Fourth Movement of 1919, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California
Press, 1986, pp.5-6.
4  Wang Bin maintains that the un-examined use of the term of ‘intellectual’  in the
Chinese context is rather problematic since the ideal personality of Western and Chinese
intellectuals are contradictory. See Wang Bin 王宾, « Zhongxi zhishifenzi “lixiang renge”
duibi  yanjiu  »  中西知识分子“理想人格”对比研究  [A  comparative  study  on  the  ‘ideal
personality’ of Chinese and Western intellectuals] in Houxiandai zai dangdai zhongguo
de  mingyun:  zhutixing  de  kunhuo  后现代在当代中国的命运：主体性的困惑  [The
destiny of post-modernity in contemporary China: the troubled subjectivity], Wang Bin,
Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999, pp. 151-174.
5  These two terms come from a famous line from Yueyang Louji 岳阳楼记 [Essay about
the Yueyang Tower] by Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹. This line “位庙堂之高则忧其民，居江湖之
远则忧其君” literally means “When situated in the high posts of the imperial court, they
worry about the people; when located in the corners far away the Capital, they worry
about the Emperor”.
6  See Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the
May Fourth Movement of 1919, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California
Press, 1986, pp.5-6.
7  By studying three leading figures during this era, i.e., Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Hu Shih, and Lu
Hsun, Lin Yü-sheng identifies the origins of  totalistic anti-traditionalism in the May
Fourth  Era  as  the  intrusion  of  Western  civilization  and  the  cultural-intellectualistic
approach. Lin further illustrates this concept: the cultural-intellectualistic approach was
simplistic,  but by virtue of  its  simplicity it  provided an ideological  basis for Chinese
intellectuals to map out their future paths in the midst of China’s unprecedented socio-
political and cultural crisis. It was a common presupposition that moulded the outlooks
of various members of the first two generations—one of the few defining traits that gave
them their characteristic identity – but the specific positions of divergent groups among
the Chinese intelligentsia were,  of  course,  by no means solely a consequence of  this
approach. Lin raises these questions in his conclusion: if many leading figures of the
May Fourth intelligentsia were dominated by their conception of the unity of political
and  cultural  orders  and  by  a  traditionally  derived,  intellectualistic-holistic  mode  of
thinking, several pertinent questions arise. Are the same traditional forces still at work
in contemporary China? Was Mao Tse-tung influenced by the cultural intellectualistic
approach? Was Mao’s simultaneous call for transforming the nature of the Chinese man
and for placing “politics in command” a reflection of a traditional pattern of thought that
takes for granted close integration of the cultural-moral and socio-political orders? Was
his recurring iconoclastic urge related to the totalistic iconoclasm of the May Fourth
era?  See  Lin  Yü-sheng,  The  Crisis  of  Chinese  Consciousness:  Radical
Anti-traditionalism in  the  May Fourth  Era,  Madison,  Wisconsin,  The  University  of
Wisconsin Press, 1979. pp. 156-158.
8  Mao’s idea of “revolutionary popular culture” is clearly stated in his seminal essay
“On New Democracy”: “Revolutionary culture is a powerful revolutionary weapon for
the  broad  masses  of  the  people.  It  prepares  the  ground  ideologically  before  the
revolution comes and is an important,  indeed essential,  fighting front in the general
revolutionary front during the revolution. People engaged in revolutionary work are the
commanders at various levels on this cultural front. “Without revolutionary theory there
can  be  no  revolutionary  movement”;  one  can  thus  see  how  important  the  cultural
movement is for the practical revolutionary movement. Both the cultural and practical
movements must be of the masses.  Therefore all  progressive cultural workers in the
anti-Japanese war must have their own cultural battalions, that is, the broad masses. A
cultural worker or a cultural ideology detached from the popular masses is a “shadow”
commander without an army, whose firepower cannot bring the enemy down. To attain
this objective, written Chinese must be reformed, given the requisite conditions, and our
spoken language brought closer to that of the people, for the people, it must be stressed,
are the inexhaustible source of our revolutionary culture.” See Mao Zedong, « On New
Democracy  »,  Timothy  Cheek  trans.,  Timothy  Cheek,  Mao  Zedong  and  China’s
Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents, Boston, Bedford/St. Martin's, c2002, p
93.
9  That literature should be subordinated to revolution as propaganda was not Mao’s
original thought in his cultural theory; rather, as Pickowicz describes it, “Mao said very
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little that had not been said already by Qu”. Liu Kang also notes that Qu inaugurated a
decisive shift  in Chinese Marxism from Shanghai to the rural  areas,  Jiangxi  at  first.
However, Mao’s recuperation of Qu Qiubai’s thoughts and unaccomplished tasks in his
regime was a much more severe one of spectacular success. For Mao, literature is more
than a gramophone—it should be “cogs and wheels of the revolutionary machine”. See
Paul G. Pickowicz, Marxist literary thought in China: the influence of Ch‘ü Ch‘iu-pai,
Berkeley,  University  of  California  Press,  c1981.  See  also  Liu  Kang,  Aesthetics  and
Marxism:  Chinese  Aesthetic  Marxists  and  their  Western  Contemporaries,  Duram,
Duke University Press, 2000.
10  I adopt Tsou Tang’s term of “totalism” in the sense that a political regime takes total
control  of  the  state  and the  society.  This  political  totalism is  interwined with social
revolution  in  the  beginning  of  twentieth  century  China.  See  Tsou  Tang,  ‘Political
Totalism,  Authoritarianism,  and Hegemony:  A Proposed Theoretical  Scheme for  the
Study of the Transformation of the Traditional Sociopolitical Order into a Communist
System in China,’ presented at the Northern Illinois University, October 27, 1982. See
also Tsou Tang 邹镋, « Zhongguo ershi shiji zhengzhi yu xifang zhengzhixue » 中国二十
世纪政治与西方政治学[Twentieth  century  Chinese  politics  and  western  political
studies], Ershi shiji zhongguo zhengzhi – cong hongguan lishi yu weiguan xingdong
jiaodu  kan  二十世纪中国政治——从宏观历史与微观行动角度看  [Twentieth  Century
Chinese  Politics:  From  the  Perspective  of  Macro-History  and  Micro-Mechanism
Analysis], Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 3-4.
11   Although the  book  uses  a  shorter  term of  sixiang yundong  for  convenience,  Li
Honglin  李洪林  prefers  the  term  of  sixiang  douzheng  yundong  思想斗争运动  [the
movements of ideological struggles]. The former usually refers to the emergence and
dissemination of ideas without political interference. It could be used to describe the
European Renaissance and the Chinese New Culture Movement in the May Fourth Era.
The latter denotes an exclusive phenomenon in contemporary China, which refers to the
CCP-led political movements that remould the thinking of Chinese people. The incited
massive pipan douzheng  批判斗争  [judgment and fighting]  dwarf  Chinese people  in
order that  they become the docile  instruments  of  the Party.  See Li  Honglin 李洪林,
Zhongguo  sixiang  yundong  shi  (1949-1989  nian)  中国思想运动史1949-1989年  [A
history of  ideological  movements in China (1949-1989)],  Hong Kong,  Cosmos Books
Ltd., 2010.
12   In  the  1930s,  many  intellectuals  fled  from  the  lost  urban  cities  and  settled
themselves  in  Yenan,  the  centre  of  Chinese  Communist  Party  regime.  They  were
welcomed with great respect and, of course, much expectation that they should serve for
Chinese revolution. In the early 1940s, some intellectuals represented by Ding Ling 丁
玲, Xiao Jun 肖军, Wang Shiwei 王实味, disillusioned by the Epicureanism among some
high-rank party cadres and the party’s failure to live up to its own egalitarian goals,
wrote quite a number of biting criticism against the wrongs in the communist regime
(Hsia 1999:308-309). Confronted with these unexpected attacks, Mao then launched the
Rectification Movement (Zhengfeng Yundong) in the spring of 1942, which he directed
toward building a unified party committed to common ideas, methods, and goals. See
Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China, Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1971, p 392.
13  In May of the same year, Mao convoked the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art.
Mao delivered an opening speech at  the first  session of  the forum and a conclusive
speech at the last session. These two lectures were later edited as Talks from the Yan’an
Forum on Literature and Art. In this text, Mao proposed the unification of high culture
and low culture, in which he cleverly handled the duality between the elite intellectuals
and  the  masses  by  giving  a  double-sense  meaning  to  “the  masses”  as  the  potential
audience and readers  of  “popularized literature and arts.”  He excluded the landlord
class,  imperialists,  and  bourgeois  from  the  body  of  “the  people.”  By  this  negative
definition, the purified “literature for the masses”,  contrary to the “literature for the
exploiters  and  oppressors”  and  “traitor  literature,”  should  be  for  and  only  for  the
“broadest selection of the people.” For a full text of the Talks, please see Mao Zedong 毛
泽东,  « Zai Yan’an wenyi zuotanhui shang de jianghua » 在延安文艺座谈会上的讲话,
translated  by  Kirk  Denton,  Kirk  Denton  ed.,  Modern  Chinese  Literary  Thought:
Writings on literature, 1893-1945, p. 473.
14  See Merle Goldman, « The party and the intellectuals: phase two », Merle Goldman
and Leo Ou-fan Lee ed., An Intellectual History of Modern China, Cambridge & New
York, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp 349-394.
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